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ON DWORKIN AND BORKIN'
Tom Lininger*
By
RichardDavis. New York: Oxford University Press, 2005. Pp. 3, 211. $28.
ELECTING JUSTICE: FIXING THE SUPREME COURT NOMINATION PROCESS.

JUSTICE IN

ROBES. By Ronald Dworkin. Cambridge: Harvard University

Press, 2006. Pp. 1, 308. $35.
INTRODUCTION

In 2005, for the first time in 34 years,' the President of the United States
faced the task of filling two Supreme Court vacancies in the same year.2 A
great national debate ensued. The debate focused not only on the qualifications of the President's nominees, but also on the nomination process itself.
Acrimony seemed ineluctable. One nomination proved so controversial that
the candidate withdrew her name.3 The hearings on the President's nominations dominated national news for months. Eventually, by January 31, 2006,
the nomination hearings closed and the Supreme Court once again had a full
complement of justices.4 Yet a number of vexing questions about the nomination process-and about the very duties of a Supreme Court justicepersist to this day.
Contemporaneously with the confirmation hearings in 2005-06, two authors published important works that helped to illuminate the national
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1. The Secretary of the U.S. Senate maintains a list of all Supreme Court nominations since
1789. See U.S. Senate Statistics and Lists: Supreme Court Nominations, www.senate.gov/
pagelayout/reference/nominations/Nominations.htm (last visited Sept. 10, 2006). This list indicates
that the White House has not made two nominations to the Court in the same year since 1971, when
President Richard Nixon nominated both William Rehnquist and Lewis Powell. President Ronald
Reagan submitted two nominations in 1986, but only one nominee was new to the Court: the death
of Chief Justice Warren Burger necessitated the nomination of a new justice (Antonin Scalia) and
also a new chief justice (Rehnquist).
2. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor announced her resignation on July 1, 2005, effective upon
the confirmation of her successor. William Branigin, Fred Barbash, & Daniela Deane, Supreme
CourtJustice O'ConnorResigns, WASH. PosT., July 1, 2005, at Al. Chief Justice William Rehnquist
died on September 2, 2005. David G. Savage & Henry Weinstein, Supreme Court Picture Gets
Complex, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 5,2005, atA10.
3. President Bush's first choice to succeed O'Connor was Harriet Miers, who then served as
White House counsel. Miers withdrew on October 26, 2005. Jonathan Weisman, Rift's Repercussions Could Last Rest of Term, WASH. POST, Oct. 28, 2005, at A8.
4. On January 31, 2006, John Roberts, the replacement for Chief Justice Rehnquist, swore
in Samuel Alito, the replacement for Justice Sandra Day O'Connor. Roberts had taken his seat on
the Court on September 29, 2005. John David Kirkpatrick, Alito Sworn In as Justice After Senate
Gives Approval, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 2006, at A2 1.
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debate. The first of these books, Ronald Dworkin's' Justice in Robes, considers the proper role of morality in jurisprudence. Dworkin argues that
judges' subjective, value-laden conceptions of justice are central to their
adjudication, even when the judges aspire to absolute textual fidelity.
Dworkin contends that judges must discern the morals and principles underlying the law and then apply these morals and principles as faithfully as the
law itself. According to Dworkin, no judge can, or should, set aside such
moralistic interpretation in favor of "strict constructionism."
A second author, Richard Davis,6 analyzes the modem process for nominating and confirming Supreme Court justices. In his book Electing Justice:
Fixing the Supreme Court Nomination Process, Davis traces the evolution of

this process over the last several decades. Davis notes that the controversy
surrounding the 1987 nomination of Judge Robert Bork ushered in a new
era. Bork had shared his political views candidly during his confirmation
hearings, and he endured such vituperation that his name became a verb in
popular parlance.7 The lesson of the Bork hearings is clear: any nominee
who wants to win confirmation must hide his or her judicial philosophy and
morality from public scrutiny. Davis contends that the present nomination
and confirmation process places a premium on evasiveness, which is hardly
an admirable quality in a Supreme Court justice.
The tension between Dworkin's book and Davis's book merits close attention. Dworkin insists that the moral philosophy of judges is, and should
be, an important determinant of their jurisprudence. Yet, as Davis points out,
the confirmation process for Supreme Court nominees does not permit
meaningful discussion of normative matters. Thus the judicial philosophy
that is so central in Dworkin's analysis is paradoxically inscrutable during
the confirmation process that Davis analyzes.
This Essay will use Dworkin's and Davis's scholarship as a jumping-off
point for a discussion of the Supreme Court nomination process. I argue that
while Dworkin's and Davis's books, when read together, expose a significant problem with the current nomination process, a possible solution to this
predicament may lie in a change to the judicial code of ethics and the procedural rules for confirmation of judges.
My analysis will proceed in four steps. Part I will address Dworkin's arguments. Part II will evaluate the analysis and evidence in Davis's book.
Part III will consider an additional variable to which neither Dworkin nor
Davis paid significant attention: the ethical rules for judges. Finally, Part IV
will offer proposals for reforms that would permit forthright discussion of

5.

Frank Henry Sommer Professor of Law, New York University School of Law.

6.

Professor of Political Science, Brigham Young University.

7. Commentators now use the term "Borking" to refer to prolonged, virulent attacks on
judicial nominees. Stephanie Seymour, The Judicial Nomination Process: How Broken Is It?, 39
TULSA L. REV. 691, 701 (2004). "Borking" carries a connotation of unfairness. Mark Tushnet, By
Definition, 9 GREEN BAG 2D 11 (2005). After the Bork debacle, the goal of many Supreme Court
nominees is to avoid "Borking" by refraining from candid discussion of judicial philosophy or morality. Davis, p. 166.
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nominees' views during confirmation hearings, but would not unduly hinder
the nomination process.
I. DWORKIN's ARGUMENT

Ronald Dworkin, one of the nation's foremost legal philosophers,8 has
solidified his legacy with his latest book. Justice in Robes presents a synthesis of Dworkin's jurisprudential theory. He explains the evolution of his
thinking and the influences to which he has reacted. Most intriguingly, Justice in Robes includes several chapters challenging the leading proponents
of competing jurisprudential theories. Accessible, provocative, and enlivened by frequent clash, Justice in Robes offers an ideal primer for students
beginning their study of jurisprudence, and the book also rewards close
scrutiny by scholars who are already familiar with Dworkin's philosophy.
Dworkin asks a simple question at the outset of Justice in Robes: "How
should a judge's moral convictions bear on his judgments about what the
law is?" (Dworkin, p. 1). Dworkin posits that morality and law are ineluctably intertwined. The interpretation of law is to a great degree a normative
enterprise because the law leaves interstices in which judges must rely on
their intuitive understanding of justice (Dworkin, pp. 18-21, 187). Even for
those judges who do not explicitly embrace a moralistic interpretation of
law, the act of articulating a legal interpretation entails explaining and justifying past legal practice, and this process draws out what the interpreter
considers valuable. According to Dworkin, strict constructionism-the notion that a judge could set aside his or her morality and simply follow the
letter of the law-is a hopeless fallacy.9
Dworkin does not lament the overlap of law and morality; he celebrates
it. Jurisprudence benefits from a candid acknowledgement of law's moral
underpinnings. After all, law itself is little more than a codification of
8. A former Rhodes Scholar and clerk for Learned Hand, Dworkin has taught at Yale Law
School, at the NYU School of Law, and at Oxford University, where he succeeded H.L.A. Hart.
Dworkin has written some of the most important legal philosophical works of our time, including
TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977), A MAT-TER OF PRINCIPLE (1985), LAW'S EMPIRE (1986), PHILOSOPHICAL ISSUES IN SENILE DEMENTIA (1987), A BILL OF RIGHTS FOR BRITAIN (1990), LIFE'S
DOMINION (1993), FREEDOM'S LAW (1996), and SOVEREIGN VIRTUE (2000). Justine Burley has
recently published a compilation of essays criticizing Dworkin's work. This volume includes some
responses by Dworkin himself. DWORKIN AND HIS CRITICS, WITH REPLIES BY DWORKIN (Justine
Burley ed., 2004). An empirical study has shown that Dworkin is the most influential scholar in
legal philosophy today. Brian Leiter, a professor of law and philosophy at the University of Texas,
determined that more law review articles have cited Dworkin than have cited any other legal philosopher. See Top 10 Most Cited Faculty by Areas, 2002-03, http://www.leiterrankings.com/
faculty/2002faculty-impact-areas.shtml (last visited Sept. 22, 2006). In fact, Dworkin's citations
exceed the closest competitor's citations by a margin of four to one. Id. Dworkin's preeminence in
the field does not mean that all legal philosophers concur with his theories. See Thom Brooks, Book
Review, 69 MODERN L. REV. 140, 140 (2006) (reviewing Dworkin and His Critics: with Replies by
Dworkin (Justine Burley ed., 2004)) ("[Dworkin] is one of the most cited and read legal philosophers alive. Yet this wide readership has not translated into more than a small number of disciples. It
is quite rare to find anyone in the field identifying herself as a 'Dworkinian.' Indeed, Andrea
Dworkin may well have the larger following.").
9. Dworkin's objections to exclusive positivism-an approach to legal interpretation that
attempts to exclude moral considerations-pervade his book. E.g., Dworkin, pp. 26-33, 198-211.
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values,' o so it should not seem surprising that judges resort to their own conceptions of morality as a guide to the interpretation of law. Dworkin goes so
far as to suggest that law is but a department of morality (Dworkin, p. 34).
Nearing the end of his distinguished career, Dworkin has decided to respond in a comprehensive manner to the theorists with whom he disagrees.
For example, he inveighs against the originalism espoused by Supreme
Court Justice Antonin Scalia. According to Dworkin, Justice Scalia focuses
too much on the text of individual constitutional provisions, and too little on
"constitutional integrity"-a broader notion that incorporates consideration
of the entire Constitution, the principles that pervade the Constitution, and
the history of this nation (Dworkin, pp. 118-19).
Dworkin resumes his criticism of H.L.A. Hart's doctrinal positivism.
"
According to Dworkin, positivists believe that
a community's law consists only of what its lawmaking officials have declared to be the law, so that it is a mistake to suppose that some
nonpositive force or agency-objective moral truth or God or the spirit of
an age or the diffuse will of the people or the tramp of history through
time, for example--can be a source of law unless lawmaking officials have
declared it to be. (Dworkin, p. 187)
Dworkin believes that proper legal interpretation is not so facile. Judges
who must interpret the law draw on moral considerations in a way that positivism cannot explain (Dworkin, p. 187). A "judge or citizen who has to
decide what the law is on some complicated issue must interpret past law to
see what principles best justify it, and then decide what those principles require in the fresh case" (Dworkin, p. 141). The animating principles of law
are a distraction for a positivist theorist, 2 but they are the central focus for
Dworkin.
Seventh Circuit Judge Richard Posner also draws Dworkin's ire. Labeled
"Darwin's new bulldog" by Dworkin, Judge Posner has argued that moral

10. A fascinating set of essays addressing this proposition appears in a 2003 symposium
issue of the American Journalof Jurisprudence.The symposium, entitled Has the Law Moral Foundations?, includes contributions from several prominent legal philosophers. See, e.g., Joseph Raz,
About Moralityand the Nature of Law, 48 Am. J. JuRis. 1 (2003).
11.
In his seminal 1961 work, The Concept of Law, H.L.A. Hart defined doctrinal positivism
as follows: "According to my theory, the existence and content of the law can be identified... without reference to morality except where the law thus identified has itself incorporated moral criteria
for the identification of law." H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 269 (2d ed. 1994). The ensuing
debate between Hart and Dworkin played an "organizing role in the jurisprudential curriculum" of
the latter twentieth century. Brian Leiter, Beyond the Hart/Dworkin Debate: The Methodology Problem in Jurisprudence,48 Am. J. JURIS. 17, 18 (2003). Leiter, who leads a new generation of legal
philosophers, has suggested that the Hart/Dworkin axis may no longer provide the best organizational framework for the twenty-first century because scholarship in the area of jurisprudence has
become much more nuanced. Id.
12. It is important to emphasize here that a subcategory of positivist theory, sometimes described as "inclusive positivism," envisions a role for morality in legal interpretation. Scholars such
as Jules Coleman at Yale have posited that "moral criteria [should] figure in tests for identifying
valid law, but only if the legal community has adopted a convention that so stipulates." Dworkin,
p. 188 (summarizing Coleman's theory). Dworkin criticizes the inclusive positivist perspective in
pages 188-98 of his book.
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theory cannot provide a "solid basis" for judgment (Dworkin, p. 81). Of
course, Judge Posner favors the empirical approach more typical of the lawand-economics school. Dworkin chides Posner for underestimating the capacity of judges to apply morality to the task of judging. In one particularly
biting passage, Dworkin suggests that "Posner's bad arguments may well be
traps, for one of his central claims is that judges are not good at philosophical reasoning, and he may be tempting critics to help prove his claim by
showing it is true of at least one .. " (Dworkin, p. 74).
Dworkin criticizes John Rawls's doctrine of public reason on the ground
that it inhibits judges' reliance on their own subjective morality. Rawls has
sought to define the kinds of arguments that are permissible for officials in a
politically liberal community, including judges (Dworkin, p. 252). Rawls
insists that judges may only accept those justifications that all reasonable
members of a political community would support (Dworkin, p. 252). Judges
must eschew "controversial religious, moral, or philosophical doctrines,"
according to Dworkin's interpretation of Rawlsian theory (Dworkin, p. 252).
Dworkin cannot abide such a jurisprudential straitjacket. He argues that it
would be both impossible and undesirable for judges to forsake their own
moral opinions on the ground that these opinions could diverge from the
prevailing "public reason" (Dworkin, p. 254).
Dworkin's criticisms of these other theorists share a common denominator: he debunks what he believes to be the myth of neutral jurisprudence.
Dworkin insists that no legal system can identify law without recourse to its
merits. The title of his book, Justice in Robes, aptly summarizes his position: it is each judge's subjective understanding of right and wrong, rather
than simply the intrinsic force of law itself, that determines justice in our
legal system.
He ends by offering a new "intellectual topography." Rather than charting law and morality as two different intellectual domains, Dworkin
suggests that they are coextensive. We should not deny the interrelationship
of law and morality, but seek to understand it better. So enlightened, "[w]e
would no longer doubt that justice plays a role in fixing what the law is. We
could then concentrate on the more complex and important issue of precisely what that role is" (Dworkin, p. 35).
Dworkin's conflation of jurisprudence and morality is vulnerable to a
number of criticisms. First, it is implausible to suggest that a readily ascertainable morality underlies a particular law. Some laws owe their origin to
ugly political compromises that sought a middle ground between completely
incongruous philosophies. After all, the legislature did not earn the moniker
"the sausage factory" for its fealty to principle.
Second, the jurisprudential approach advocated by Dworkin might cause
unpredictability in the administration of justice. To the extent that judges
veer from the legal text to abstract moral or philosophical considerations,
the rulings of these judges will be much harder to foretell. Pretrial settlement will be more difficult when trial outcomes are unpredictable. The
legitimacy of the judicial system may suffer when unsuccessful litigants are
unable to ascribe outcomes to readily discernible law.
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Third, Dworkin's conception of normative decision-making seems better
suited for the legislature than the judiciary. The job of legislators is to
interact frequently with electors and express their views in the formulation
of public policy. Judges, by contrast, are relatively isolated in courtrooms
where they react passively to fact patterns presented to them. Legislators are
in the best position to make normative judgments, and judges are best
equipped to apply the legislative judgments in particular cases. A judge who
resorts to abstract notions of right and wrong, rather than confining his or
her analysis to the statute in question, is arguably usurping the legislative
function.
Notwithstanding these criticisms, it is difficult to dispute the descriptive
(as opposed to prescriptive) portion of Dworkin's book. Judges do in fact
rely on their subjective normative philosophies in adjudicating cases for
which the law does not dictate a clear outcome. Whether or not judges admit
it, they are the law. Judges are as important as the statutory text, and perhaps
even as important as the constitutional text; they are justice in robes.
The great significance of judges' normative philosophies heightens the
importance of selecting judges in a manner that explores their philosophies.
Dworkin himself explored this topic in two essays for the New York Review
of Books in the midst of the controversy surrounding the appointment of
new Supreme Court justices in 2005 and 2006. 3 But the appointment process may lie outside the expertise of a legal philosopher. An interdisciplinary
approach is necessary to bridge the rift between jurisprudence and realpolitik.
II.

DAVIS'S ARGUMENT

Richard Davis,14 a political scientist, analyzes the confirmation of Supreme Court nominees from a more practical perspective. Davis's latest
work, Electing Justice: Fixing the Supreme Court Nomination Process, presents the results of careful investigation. He interviewed Supreme Court
nominees including Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Justice Stephen Breyer,
and Judge Robert Bork, as well as U.S. Senator Orrin Hatch and key Senate
staff. Davis also surveyed the available records of Supreme Court confirmation hearings since the 1960s, and his comprehensive analysis enables him

13. Ronald Dworkin, Judge Roberts on Trial, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Oct. 20, 2005, at 17 (complaining that in Chief Justice Roberts's confirmation hearing, he only "reiterated banalities about
being guided by the law.... or taking due account of precedent," but he scarcely revealed his "constitutional philosophy"); Ronald Dworkin, The Strange Case of Judge Alito, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Feb.
23, 2006, at 15 (similarly criticizing Justice Alito's comments in his confirmation hearing).
14.
Davis has written a number of important books analyzing the influence of the media and
mass communication in American politics. These books include THE PRESS AND AMERICAN POLITICS: THE NEW MEDIATOR (3d ed., Prentice Hall 2001), THE WEB OF POLITICS: THE INTERNET'S
IMPACT ON THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SYSTEM (1999), NEW MEDIA AND AMERICAN POLITICS
(1998), and POLITICS AND THE MEDIA (1994). With his background in the political phenomenon of

intense media scrutiny, Davis is well suited to analyze the evolution of Supreme Court confirmation
hearings over the last three decades.
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to draw a number of important conclusions about the transformation of the
process for nomination and confirmation of Supreme Court justices."
The central figure in Davis's story is Judge Robert Bork. Prior to the
nomination of Judge Bork to the Supreme Court in 1987, the politics of confirmation hearings had been somewhat staid and predictable (Davis, p. 30).
The president would select a nominee based on considerations such as ideology, competence, friendship, and representativeness of various
constituencies (Davis, pp. 16-20, 40-51). The role of the U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee was to P6rovide "advice and consent"-generally more of
the latter than the former.
Bork's nomination took more time to consider than any prior nomination. Statistics compiled by Davis document the ease with which Supreme
Court nominees won confirmation in the pre-Bork era.' 7 As Davis observed,
a total of 115 days passed from the nomination of Robert Bork to the withdrawal of his nomination by President Reagan. That time period almost
equaled the combined periods between nomination and confirmation for all
Supreme Court nominees in the 1970s (Davis, p. 68).
Why was Bork's confirmation so much more difficult? One possible reason is Bork's peculiar personality. He was unapologetic, even pugnacious,
and would not back away from a fight. Rather than sidestep a difficult question, he would generally provide a forthright, principled answer. "Robert
Bork's willingness to engage the committee in discussions of legal philosophy and defend many of his views on specific legal issues and even specific
cases became a model to avoid for successive nominees" (Davis, p. 166).
The timing of the Bork nomination coincided with a period of contentious relations between the White House and Congress. In 1987, President
Reagan's popularity was at a low ebb. Congress was ready to defy President
Reagan in a manner that had seemed out of the question when his popularity
had been higher (Davis, p. 71).
Meanwhile, a number of "external players" began to exert influence over
the confirmation process. Interest groups factored much more significantly
in the Bork confirmation hearings than ever before (Davis, pp. 24-30). Hundreds of interest groups entered the fray: left-wing groups such as the
Alliance for Justice, the National Abortion Rights Action League (NARAL),
and the National Organization for Women (NOW) vied against right-wing
groups including the Institute for Justice, the Family Research Council, and
Concerned Women for America. The heightened involvement occurred as
the advocacy groups recognized that they could influence the Court's
15.
p. vii.

Davis discussed his methodology in the acknowledgments at the start of his book. Davis,

16. Davis, pp. 20-24, 30. The Senate frequently acquiesced in nominations. In some cases,
nominees did not even testify in connection with their confirmation hearings. Davis, p. 21.
17. During the years 1789-1809, the average time period between nomination of confirmation was 2.56 days; from 1810-30, the average time period was 8 days; from 1831-50, 11.56 days;
from 1851-70, 12.3 days; from 1871-90, 24.91 days; from 1891-1910, 8.33 days; from 1911-30,
24.1 days; from 1931-50, 12.62 days; from 1951-70, 57.91 days; from 1971-80, 38.6 days; from
1981-90, 94.3 days; and from 1991-94, 75.7 days. Davis, p. 67.
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"policy-making" and also realized that their participation in the nomination
battle helped boost their membership (Davis, p. 95). These groups brought
intense pressure to bear on senators, prodding the senators to take aggressive
positions in the confirmation hearings.
Beginning with the Bork hearings, the media took a much greater interest in the confirmation of Supreme Court nominees. Davis offers data
contrasting the media coverage of Supreme Court nominations during the
pre-Bork and post-Bork eras. The New York Times' references to confirmation hearings increased by 38%. The references in Time magazine increased
by 300% (Davis, p. 98). Coverage of nominations on television news shows
also increased dramatically (Davis, pp. 99-100). Part of the media interest
was attributable to the greater engagement of advocacy groups. "Suzanne
Garment, a Bork supporter, wrote that 'there had never been anything remotely resembling the scale of the national media campaign that was
launched against Bork.' "is Another explanation for the increased media coverage was the transformation of communications technology in the 1980san era that saw the advent of twenty-four-hour television news and mass
communication via the internet, among other developments.
The Bork hearings emboldened interest groups to take an active role in
subsequent confirmation hearings. Examples of such groups include the
aforementioned left-leaning organizations such as the Alliance for Justice,
NARAL, and NOW, as well as right-leaning counterparts such as the Institute for Justice, the Family Research Council, and Concerned Women for
America (Davis, p. 28). The groups now interview prospective nominees
and present them with "litmus tests." Some groups actually give the White
House lists of acceptable nominees (Davis, p. 109). The media covers the
machinations of interest groups just as thoroughly as the confirmation hearings themselves.
For its part, the White House trains nominees carefully for their media
appearances and their congressional testimony. The conventional wisdom is
that nominees should "frequently resort to nonreply answers that give the
illusion of a reply but offer no substantive information about the nominee"
(Davis, p. 166). For example, when President Clinton nominated Ruth Bader
Ginsberg to the Court, a White House aide told her that she was "more
likely to lose votes for what you say than what you don't say" (Davis, p.
166). Nominee Antonin Scalia-no wallflower, to be sure-even declined
to comment on whether Marbury v. Madison was wrongly decided (Davis,
p. 166). As the nominees and their "handlers" are keenly aware, a nominee
who candidly reveals his or her judicial philosophy may meet with the same
fate of Judge Bork (Davis, p. 166).
Davis claims that "[i]n a sense, selecting justices for the Supreme Court
is an election without voters" (Davis, p. 9). The nominee and his or her handlers at the White House develop an image they wish to project, and they
script public appearances so the nominee does not stray "off-message." The
18. Davis, p. 75 (quoting Suzanne Garmet, The War Against Robert Bork,
Jan. 1988, at 19).

COMMENTARY,
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White House arranges for nominees to meet under controlled circumstances
with senators and key interest groups in advance of the confirmation hearings. The manipulation of the media, the careful engagement of interest
groups, and the crafting of messages for public consumption are all hallmarks of modem electoral politics. Davis notes that the only missing
ingredient is the ballot box.
Davis's description of the changes in the confirmation process is generally accurate, but his book does invite some criticism. First, he
underestimates the salutary effect of intense public scrutiny since the Bork
hearings. One might argue that the Bork confirmation hearing was not a
debacle, but a vindication of democratic power as expressed in the Senate's
"advice and consent" function. Public engagement in the selection of new
Supreme Court justices brings a measure of accountability and increases
public awareness of Court's important work. The term "Borking" may simply be no more than sour grapes. 9 Public outcry has been beneficial in
keeping unqualified nominees off the Court. Perhaps Harriet Miers would
be wearing a robe right now if the public and the media had not been so
vigilant.
A second shortcoming of Davis's book is his exaggeration of the Bork
hearings' importance within the overall political landscape of the mid1980s. The Bork hearings were subject to the same political forces that
transformed all American politics in that period. The Bork hearings were not
the harbinger of a new political era, but were simply the latest in a series of
high-profile congressional hearings, such as the Iran-Contra hearing, that
demonstrated the tremendous power of the media and growing influence of
interest groups. Davis's book implies a uniqueness that the historical record
does not support.
These criticisms do not detract from Davis's achievement. He has shown
that the confirmation process is largely a charade in which nominees spend
more energy avoiding tough questions than divulging their views. Like
Dworkin, Davis would favor a more explicit discussion of judicial philosophy.
III.

ETHICAL RULES FOR JUDGES

Neither author pays enough attention to the role of ethical rules for
judges. Do the ethical rules create an obligation of candor that might override the political impulse to withhold information from the Senate Judiciary
Committee? Or, alternatively, do the ethical rules compound the problem by
providing a rationale for concealment of nominees' views?
The ethical rules for judges appear in the ABA Model Code of Judicial
Conduct, and most states have adopted them to varying degrees. ° These

19. Harvard Law School Professor Randall Kennedy suggests that rigorous scrutiny of Supreme Court nominees is defensible, even if the confirmation process has become much more
politicized than ever before. Randall Kennedy, The Casefor Borking, AMERICAN PROSPECT ONLINE,

July 2, 2001, www.prospect.org/print/V 12/12/kennedy-r.html.
20.

MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (1990).
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rules apply to state court judges and (due to the cross-reference in lawyers'

ethical rules) to lawyers seeking appointment to judicial office." Federal
judges are subject to a slightly different set of rules. Indeed, it is likely
that virtually every nominee to the U.S. Supreme Court will be subject to
some sort of ethical code for judges, whether that nominee is presently a
federal judge, a state judge, or simply a lawyer.23

While the ethical rules for judges do not presently include any obligation that judges or judicial candidates must forthrightly disclose their
judicial philosophies in confirmation hearings, the Model of Code of Judicial Conduct requires that a candidate for judicial office "shall not ...

knowingly misrepresent the identity, qualifications, present position or other
fact concerning the candidate or an opponent. ' 24 The ethical rules for law-

yers include similar provisions that prohibit affirmative misrepresentations
of lawyers seeking appointment as judges.25 The problem with these rules is
that they only prohibit false statements and do not impose an obligation to
be forthright. A candidate for judicial office could comply fully with exist-

ing rules by declining to make any statement concerning his or her own
views. Even an evasive answer to a question about the candidate's views
could be compliant with the present ethical rules for judges, provided that
the answer does not make any affirmative misrepresentations.
Not only do the ethical rules for judges fail to require forthright disclosure of judicial philosophy, but the rules have generally provided many
excuses for judges and nominees to dodge questions about substantive matters. A set of provisions has walled off certain topics from public discussion
in order to avoid the appearance of "prejudgment." These provisions include
two clauses that are particularly noteworthy: the "announce clause" and the
"pledges and promises clause."
The announce clause originally appeared in the 1972 ABA Model Code
of Judicial Conduct. This clause provided that a "candidate for a judicial
office, including an incumbent judge," shall not "announce his or her views

21.
Rule 8.2(b) of the ABA's Model Rules of ProfessionalConduct (i.e., the ethical rules of
lawyers who are not judges) provides that "[a] lawyer who is a candidate for judicial office shall
comply the applicable provisions of the Code of Judicial Conduct." MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.2(b) (2002).
22. Federal judges are governed by the Code of Conduct for United States Judges, a slight
variation on the ABA's Model Code of Judicial Conduct. CODE OF CONDUCT FOR UNITED STATES
JUDGES (2000), available at www.uscourts.gov/guide/vol2/chl .html (last visited on Jan. 20, 2007).
23. Interestingly, Supreme Court justices are not subject to any of these ethical rules once
they are confirmed. Neither the Code of Judicial Conduct nor the Code of Conduct for United
States Judges are binding on Supreme Court Justices. The Court addresses ethical matters on an ad
hoc basis. E.g. Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court for D.C., 541 U.S. 913 (2004) (Scalia, J., sitting alone)
(determining that his recusal was not necessary when the Supreme Court reviewed a case involving
Vice President Richard Cheney, with whom Scalia had recently traveled on a hunting trip).
24.

MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT

Canon 5(A)(3)(d)(ii)(2003).

25. E.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.2(a) (2002) (prohibiting an affirmative
false or misleading statement of a lawyer seeking appointment or election to judicial office); MODEL
RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.4(c) (2002) (prohibiting misrepresentation by lawyers in general).
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on disputed legal or political issues. As of 2002, a total of nine states still
included the announce clause in their codes of judicial conduct," even
though the ABA had dropped this clause from the Model Code in 1990."
The U.S. Supreme Court held that the announce clause was unconstitutional
in 2002. In Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, the Court determined
that the clause violated the First Amendment by restricting freedom of
speech and denying the public information about the views of judicial can29
didates. Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, noted that restrictions such
as the announce clause would lead to vapid discussions of candidates' fitness to serve on the bench. 0
While the announce clause perished, the pledges and promises clause
remains in effect to this day. The pledges and promises clause provides that
a candidate for judicial office shall not, "with respect to cases, controversies,
or issues that are likely to come before the court, make pledges, promises or
commitments that are inconsistent with the impartial performance of the
adjudicative duties of the office."'" The Supreme Court was careful to note
that its opinion in Republican Party of Minnesota v. White did not address
32
the pledges and promises clause.
Underlying the pledges and promises clause is the supposition that
judges cannot keep an open mind with respect to future cases if they take
advance positions on key issues that could arise in those cases. As explained
by a recently convened ABA Commission examining the need for changes
to the Model Code of Judicial Conduct, the purpose of the pledges and
promises clause is to prevent "improper pledges and promises that commit a
judge or judicial candidate to decide a future case in a particular way."33
Simply put, the clause seeks to avoid prejudgment.
Unfortunately, the pledges and promises clause has provided a convenient excuse for obfuscation or evasion by candidates for judicial office who
face uncomfortable questions about their views on controversial subjects. If
a question seems to implicate a matter that might possibly come before the
court on which the candidate aspires to serve, the candidate can invoke the
ethics rules to dodge the question. John Roberts and Samuel Alito used this

26. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 7(B) (1972), quoted in Republican Party of
Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 768 (2002).
27.
Francisco R. Maderal, Note, Regulating JudicialCampaign Speech: Republican Party of
Minnesota v. White on Remand, 19 GEo. J. LEGAL ETHICS 809, 812 n.28 (2006).
28.

Republican Party of Minn., 536 U.S. at 773 n.5.

29.

Id. at 774-88.

30.
See id. at 774-78 (implying that, for example, limiting the discussion to the candidates'
personal backgrounds and work habits would not provide adequate information to evaluate their
fitness).
31.

MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5A(3)(d)(i)(2003).

32.

Republican Party of Minn., 536 U.S. at 773 n.5.

33.

ABA JOINT COMM'N TO EVALUATE THE MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, REPORT

TO THE ABA HOUSE OF DELEGATES 160 (2006), available at http://www.abanet.org/judicialethics/
house-report.pdf.
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supported
strategy repeatedly in their confirmation hearings.34 SenatorsS who
31
these nominees defended their refusal to answer questions, while other
Senators expressed exasperation that many matters of great importance
seemed to be off limits to discussion during the confirmation process. 3' At
the state level as well, a number of candidates for judicial office are declining to reveal their views on controversial issues and are citing the canons of
judicial ethics as the reason for their reluctance.37

In sum, the present ethical rules for judges do not foster the candid discussion of judicial philosophy urged by Dworkin and Davis. The present
34. For example, Judge Alito made the following comment in response to a question by
Senator Feingold about the constitutional authority of a president to defy a criminal statute: "I think
it would be irresponsible for me to say anything on the substance of the question here .... I think
anybody in my position can say no more than, 'This is the framework that the Supreme Court
precedents have provided for us. And when the issue comes up, if it comes up, if it comes before
me, if it is justiciable, I will analyze it thoroughly.' And that's all I can say." Transcript, U.S. Senate
Judiciary Committee Hearing on Judge Samuel Alito's Nomination to the Supreme Court, Part I of
III, WASH. POST, Jan. 12, 2006, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/
article/2006/01/12/AR200601120103l.html. In effect, according to Dean Lawrence Velvel of the
Massachusetts School of Law, nominees Roberts and Alito placed themselves under a "gag rule"
that allowed them to evade tough questioning. Lawrence R. Velvel, Alito and Roberts'Self-Gag Rule
is a Phony, COUNTERPUNCH, Jan. 25, 2006, available at www.counterpunch.org.velvel/
01252006.html (last visited Feb. 14, 2007).
35. The supporters of nominees Roberts and Alito insisted that these nominees should be
evaluated under the "Ginsburg standard." In other words, just like Democratic nominee Ruth Bader
Ginsburg, they should not be required to answer questions about matters that could possibly come
before the Supreme Court. Carolyn Lochhead, Alito Hearings Focus on Executive Power in Wartime, S.F CHRON., Jan. 10, 2006, available at http://www.sfgate.comcgi-binlarticle.cgi?f=/
c/a/2006/01/10/MNGBHGLOF41.DTL (last visited Feb. 14, 2007). Republican Senator Jon Kyl
made this point especially forcefully:
[N]o judicial nominee should answer any question that is designed to reveal how the nominee
will rule on any issue that could come before the court. This rule has come to be known as the
Ginsburg standard because Justice Ginsburg stated during her own confirmation hearings that
she would give no forecasts, no hints about how she would rule on issues .... Judge Alito, I'll
tell you the same thing I told John Roberts. I expect you to adhere to the Code of Judicial Conduct. And I want you to know that I will strongly defend your refusal to give any indication of
how you might rule on any matter that might come before you as a judge or to answer any
question that you believe to be improper under those circumstances.
Transcript, U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee Hearing on Judge Samuel Alito's Nomination to the
Supreme Court, Part I of II, WASH. POST, Jan. 9, 2006, available at http://www.washingtonpost.coml
wp-dyn/content/article/2006/01/09/AR2006010900755.html (last visited Feb. 14, 2007). See also id.
(statement by Senator Hatch expressing similar views).
36. Senator Schumer indicated that he found "troubling" the unwillingness of Judge Alito to
answer questions about his views on abortion, while Judge Alito offered opinions on other subjects.
Transcript, U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee Hearing on Judge Samuel Alito's Nomination to the
Supreme Court, WASH. POST, Jan. 10, 2006, Part III of III, available at http://www.washingtonpost.
com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/0l/10/AR2006011001418.html (last visited Feb. 14, 2007). Senator Feingold made this comment after several senators admonished the Democrats about questioning
Judge Alito about his views on the controversial issues of the day: "Mr. Chairman, it simply cannot
be that the only person in America who can't express an opinion on a case where Justice O'Connor
cast the deciding vote is the person who has been nominated to replace her on the court." Transcript,
U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee Hearing on Judge Samuel Alito's Nomination to the Supreme
Court, Part I of Ii, WASH. PosT, Jan. 9, 2006, availableat http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/
content/article/2006/01/09/AR2006010900755.html (last visited Feb. 14, 2007).
37. Marcia Coyle, Judicial Surveys Vex the Bench, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 8, 2006, available at
http://www.law.conjsp/article.jsp?id=l 157629870187 (last visited Feb. 14, 2007).
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rules actually have the opposite effect, providing an excuse for nominees
and candidates to avoid expressing their views on divisive topics. Evasion is
not simply an expedient political maneuver; it is also consistent with the
present ethical rules.
IV. PROPOSALS

FOR REFORM

Plainly the present process for confirming Supreme Court nominees is
not ideal. This process allows nominees to assume a position of life tenure
without meaningful prior screening of their judicial philosophy by the Senate Judiciary Committee-or by the people whom the senators represent.
Are any reforms possible that could improve the process for selecting and
confirming Supreme Court justices?
One proposal offered by Davis is to revise the Constitution so that Supreme Court justices must be elected, as they are in most states (Davis
p. 170-78). Davis believes that this alternative would necessitate greater
candor in the public pronouncements by candidates for the Court. Further,
Davis posits that election of Supreme Court justices would perhaps reduce
the influence wielded by special interest groups. But this proposal seems
more detrimental than beneficial. There is little reason to be sanguine about
the quality of public discourse in a Supreme Court race. The only nationwide elections held at present are for the office of president, and these races
are rife with pandering on topics such as flag burning, gay marriage, and
Willie Horton. Would the general public be capable of-let alone interested
in-following a debate among Supreme Court candidates about the subtleties of administrative law or federal subject matter jurisdiction? In any
event, is unlikely that sitting federal judges, many of whom have never before sought elected office, would be interested in entering a nationwide
election for the U.S. Supreme Court. Finally, the influence of special interests in such an election would be at least as great as in the present
confirmation process because candidates for elected office would be far
more dependent on interest groups for financial backing.38
Another alternative suggested by conservative theorists is to abolish or
modify the filibuster rule. 39 According to proponents of this reform, nominees for the Supreme Court are presently deterred from discussing their
views candidly because they know that the filibuster rule enables a

38.

For these reasons and others, the ABA has long opposed the election of judges at both

the state and federal levels. ABA COMM'N ON SEPARATION OF POWERS AND JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE, AN INDEPENDENT JUDICIARY 96 (1997).

39. The term "filibuster" refers to an attempt to extend debate on a proposal in order to delay
or completely prevent a vote on its passage. Under the Senate's present rules, the Senate as a whole
may end a filibuster if sixty or more senators vote for cloture. In 2005, after Democrats filibustered
confirmation votes on several of President Bush's judicial nominees, Senate Majority Leader Bill
Frist proposed to make procedural changes reducing the power of the minority to filibuster. Bill
Frist, Former Senate Majority Leader, U.S. Senate, Address to the 18th Annual Federalist Society
National Convention (Nov. 12, 2004) (transcript available at http://www.fed-soc.org/Publications/
Transcripts/frist04.pdf).
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determined group of forty-one senators to derail any nomination.4 ' But there
is no reason to believe that the elimination of the filibuster rule will diminish
the political risks of candor. The reality is that the filibuster rule provides
protection to the minority party, and the elimination of this rule would only
reduce the inhibition of Supreme Court nominees if they share the partisan
affiliation of the majority party.
A more plausible solution would be to retain the present nomination and
confirmation procedure, but to make changes that would necessitate greater
disclosure by Supreme Court nominees of their judicial philosophies and
moral views. Five reforms would greatly advance this cause: (1) modifying
the ethical rules to require greater disclosure of judicial philosophy by all
candidates and nominees; (2) narrowing the scope of the pledges and promises clause; (3) appointing a referee to determine the validity of nominees'
invocation of ethical rules as a bar to answering questions during confirmation hearings; (4) requiring the recording of all comments by nominees, or
likely nominees, in their discussions with the White House after the announcement of a vacancy on the Supreme Court; and (5) increasing the
ABA's involvement in vetting nominees before the conclusion of confirmation hearings.
First, the ethical codes for lawyers and judges should include new provisions requiring forthright disclosure of judicial philosophy by anyone
seeking appointment to the bench. This affirmative obligation would counterbalance some of the other provisions in the ethics codes, such as the
pledges and promises clause, which may create a disincentive for disclosure.
Another benefit of this proposal would be that the quality of the discussion
in confirmation hearings would depend less on the artful questioning of
senators-many of whom are not lawyers-than on the nominee's own ethical obligation to lay out his or her views thoroughly. The ABA could
develop a list of topics that merit discussion by a Supreme Court nominee
during confirmation hearings. This list could appear in the commentary published with the new ethical rule. The ABA could carefully craft questions
that are general enough to avoid committing a nominee to prejudgment in a
particular case, but that are focused enough to elicit valuable information
about the nominee's judicial philosophy.4 '
Second, the ABA should revise the pledges and promises clause so that
it does not hinder legitimate attempts to discover nominees' judicial philosophies. As presently written, the clause provides that judicial nominees
40. Supreme Court nominees know that a Republican filibuster thwarted the nomination of
Abe Fortas to become Chief Justice. Recent Democratic filibusters have blocked nominations of
federal judges by the Bush Administration. Charles Babington, FilibusterPrecedent? Democrats
Point to '68 and Fortas, WASH. POST, Mar. 18, 2005, at A3.
41.
After all, the purpose of the pledges and promises clause is not to squelch discussion of a
nominee's views, but rather to confine that discussion so that it does not compromise the nominee's
impartiality in adjudicating particular future cases. The ABA Commission, reevaluating the Code of
JudicialEthics, noted the distinction between statements "that will not interfere with future decision
making, and improper pledges and promises that commit a judge or judicial candidate to decide a
future case in a particular way." ABA JOINT COMM'N TO EVALUATE THE MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL
CONDUCT, supra note 33, at 160.
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shall not, "with respect to cases, controversies, or issues that are likely to

come before the court, make pledges, promises, or commitments that are
inconsistent with the impartial performance of the adjudicative duties of the

office. 42 This language is far too expansive. It does not contain any temporal parameters: how soon would the matter need to come before the court in
order to preclude discussion of the matter by judicial candidates? The mere
"likelihood" that a matter might reach the court is hardly a limiting principle. As the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has observed, "[there is no
almost no legal or political issue that is unlikely to come before a judge of
an American court, state or federal, of general jurisdiction. ' 43 The clause
would benefit from the addition of a final sentence: "The declaration of a
judicial candidate's views concerning a general legal theory or category of
cases shall not be deemed to violate this rule, even if a case that exemplifies
such a theory or that falls within such a category might one day come before
the court on which the candidate aspires to serve '" 44 The new sentence
would not allow prejudgment of particular cases likely to come before the
court, but this language would allow judicial candidates to explain their
views on important legal questions, thereby allowing the Senate to fulfill its
duty of advice and consent.45
Third, the Senate should appoint an official to serve as a referee adjudi-

cating "objections" by nominees who refuse to answer senators' questions
on ethical grounds. The referee might be a lower court judge or an academic
42.

MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT

43.

Buckley v. I11.
Judicial Inquiry Bd., 997 F.2d 224, 229 (7th Cir. 1993).

Canon 5A(3)(d)(i) (2004).

44. The Supreme Court's ruling in Republican Party of Minn. v.White, 536 U.S. 765 (2005)
surely does not preclude a revision of the pledges and promises clause. The Court addressed the
now-defunct announce clause, not the pledges and promises clause. In any event, while the Court
appeared to imply that the pledges and promises clause is constitutional as presently written, the
Court hardly indicated that the pledges and promises clause is necessary. There is no constitutional
mandate for the pledges and promises clause, except perhaps the obvious requirement that due process requires a judge who has not prejudged a particular case. If anything, constitutional
considerations militate in favor of easing restrictions on speech by judges and judicial candidates.
See Richard Briffault, Judicial Campaign Codes After Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 153
U. PA. L. REV. 181, 209-10 (2004) ("White carefully tiptoed around the Pledges or Promises
Clause, although, as previously indicated, its uncertain treatment of the definition of impartiality and
of the regulation of only campaign statements calls this Clause into question, too.").
45. Unfortunately, the latest draft of a proposed revision to the ABA's version of the pledges
and promises clause does not narrow the clause sufficiently. In December 2006, a blue-ribbon commission issued a report that included draft language for a new version of the clause, along with a
number of other proposed revisions to the Code of Judicial Conduct. The amended version of the
pledges and promises clause would be virtually identical to the prior version. In fact, a new comment guiding interpretation of the clause would arguably make it more restrictive. "The making a of
a pledge, promise, or commitment is not dependent upon, or limited to, the use of any specific
words or phrases; instead, the totality of the statement must be examined to determine if a reasonable person would believe that the candidate for judicial office has specifically undertaken to reach a
particular result." ABA JOINT COMM'N TO EVALUATE THE MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT,
supra note 33, cmt. 13 to Proposed Rule 4.1. Because a candidate's opinions on a legal issue naturally suggest a preference for a particular result, the proposed comment thirteen could hinder
disclosure of a candidate's views. The dividing line between permissible and impermissible opinions
will be hard to discern, and that ambiguity may have a chilling effect (or it may invite candidates to
hide their views where disclosure would be uncomfortable). The ABA House of Delegates will
consider the proposed changes at its February 2007 meeting.
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with expertise in the area of ethics. This referee could hear, in camera, the
information that the nominee believes is subject to the ethical rule prohibiting disclosure. The referee could then resolve the objection promptly.
Perhaps the ethical rules should be revised to clarify that a nominee who
discloses his or her views pursuant to a ruling by the ethics referee would be
absolved of any responsibility for an ethics violation, in much the same way
that Rule 1.6 absolves lawyers from violating their confidentiality obligations when a judge has ordered disclosure. 46 The presence of the referee
would eliminate the temptation for overbroad invocation of "ethical objections" that are little more than a subterfuge for avoiding unpleasant
questions. A right of appeal to a federal court might ensure the fairness of
the referee's rulings.
Fourth, new ethical rules are necessary to rectify the present asymmetry
whereby the White House gains extensive information about a prospective
nominee's views, while the Senate and the public can only see a rehearsed,
guarded performance during confirmation hearings. Any lawyer who speaks
with a representative of the executive or legislative branch concerning possible nomination to fill a vacancy on the Supreme Court should be required
to record every statement made by that lawyer, and to retain all such recordings for a period of five years. This rule would help to guarantee that
nominees do not make secret pacts with the White House, only to evade discussion of their philosophical views during Senate confirmation hearings.
The tapes of the nominees' discussions with the White House would be
available to the ethics referee at the confirmation hearing, so that the referee
could judge whether the nominee is answering senators' questions forthrightly. To be sure, a requirement that nominees record their interactions
with the White House will raise objections under the separation of powers
doctrine. But the scope of executive privilege has narrowed somewhat in the
last few decades,47 and the in camera review of such material by the ethics
referee would preserve its confidentiality. In the final analysis, any concerns
about the separation of powers seem somewhat disingenuous when the purpose of the measure is simply to preserve the symmetry envisioned by the
Founders when they required the Senate's advice and consent for the appointment of federal judges.
Fifth, a more active role for the American Bar Association would help to
bring nominees' judicial philosophies to light. At present, the ABA prepares
ratings of nominees' competence, but the ABA does not scrutinize the nominees' ideology. 48 The ABA's Standing Committee on the Federal Judiciary
46.

MODEL RULES PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.3 (2002).

47. E.g., Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681 (1997) (rejecting Clinton's claim that a sexual harassment suit against him should be delayed until the end of his presidency in order to avoid

discovery while he was in the White House); Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988) (upholding
Independent Counsel Act that allowed an investigator to probe the White House and executive
branch agencies); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974) (insisting on disclosure of White
House tapes that recorded conversations between the president and various aides).
48.
For example, on January 9, 2006, the chair of the ABA's Standing Committee on the
Federal Judiciary submitted a letter to Senator Arlen Specter, Chair of the Senate Judiciary Commit-
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treats politics as the third rail: "The selection of a member of the Supreme

Court involves many other factors of a broad political and ideological nature
within the discretion of the President and the Senate but beyond the special

competence of the [Standing Committee]. ' 9 Ironically, this reluctance to
consider matters of judicial philosophy abdicates a duty for which the ABA
is uniquely equipped. The members of the Senate Judiciary Committee
(many of them nonlawyers) are ill-equipped, however, to assess a nominee's
jurisprudential theory. The ABA could collect and present such information
without evaluating it. The ABA's reports could cull information about judicial philosophy from interviews with the nominee and from the nominee's

prior opinions. A nominee's refusal to speak with the ABA would risk a low
rating on judicial competence, and history has shown that
50 nominees with
low ABA ratings do not fare well in confirmation hearings.
CONCLUSION

That the shadow of Robert Bork looms above the modem confirmation
process was evident in the Senate Judiciary Committee's questioning of the
latest Supreme Court nominee, Judge Samuel Alito. Several senators wanted
to know why Alito had publicly declared in 1988 that Bork was "one of the

most outstanding nominees of this century."5 ' Alito's response to this questioning underscored the dysfunction of the present confirmation process.
Rather than explain the extent to which Bork's philosophy aligned with
Alito's own, Alito ascribed his support of Bork to his loyalty to President

Reagan, for whom Alito was then working as a Justice Department attorney.
Alito did not dare address Bork's philosophy, except to say that he disagreed

with some of Bork's views."
The strategy paid off for Alito. A man who had publicly allied himself
with Bork protected himself from "Borking" by evading a thorough disclosure of his ideological similarity to Bork. Basically, the 2005-06
confirmation hearings were an "opt-in" exercise-nominees who did not

tee, offering insight into Judge Samuel Alito's background and competence as a judge, but avoiding
any comment about his judicial philosophy. A link to this letter appears on the Standing Committee's Web Page, http://www.abanet.org/scfedjud/SCpage/Alito-letter.pdf.
49. Letter from Stephen L. Tober, Chair, ABA Standing Comm. on Fed. Judiciary, to the
Honorable Arlen Specter, Chair, U.S. Senate Judiciary Comm., at 1-2 (Jan. 9, 2006) (alteration in
the original) (quoting Letter from Lawrence Wash, Chair, ABA Standing Comm. on the Fed. Judiciary Web Page, to Senator James Eastland, Chair, U.S. Senate Judiciary Comm. (Jan. 26, 1970)),
available at http://www.abanet.org/scfedjud/Alito-letter.pdf.
50. In the last two decades, the ABA's weakest rating has been for the Clarence Thomas,
who encountered great difficulty in his confirmation hearings. Bob Dart, Thomas ends testimony;
Bush confident, ATLANTA J. CONST. Sept. 17, 1991, at El (recounting ABA's ratings of prior Supreme Court nominees).
51.
Transcript, 1988 Alito Comments to Bork's Nomination, WASH. POST, Jan. 8, 2006, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/01/08/AR2006010800528.htm].
52. Bob Egelko, How Alito Explained His High Regardfor Bork, S.F. CHRON., Jan. 17, 2006,
at A5 (noting that after Alito explained his prior support for Bork as mere loyalty to the Reagan
Administration, senators gave up this line of questioning).
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wish to divulge their jurisprudential theories could withhold that information with impunity.
This nation should aspire to more. A meaningful role for the Senate in
the selection of Supreme Court justices requires review not only of nominees' backgrounds, but also of their normative and moral orientations. Only
those nominees who have revealed their ideologies should serve on the Supreme Court.
This Essay has proposed reforms of ethical rules, the procedural rules
for confirmation hearings, and the role played by the ABA, all with the purpose of drawing out Supreme Court nominees' judicial philosophies.
Heeding Dworkin's teaching about the centrality of morality in legal interpretation, and acknowledging Davis's evidence that the present system for
screening nominees' views is broken, this Essay offers a set of strategies that
could revitalize a substantive discussion of jurisprudence. After all, there is
little point in securing the Senate's "advice and consent" without providing
the information necessary for the task.

